Episode Transcript
[00:00:00] Speaker A: Foreign.
Hi, and welcome to the Maidan Podcast.
My name is Robert Zaid Kianori Zigmund. I am a project associate at the Maidan and at the Abu Suleiman center for Global Islamic Studies here at George Mason University.
Today we are very pleased to have Dr. Abdul Al Odha, the senior policy advisor for the Gulf at the American Committee for Middle East Rights ACMER and the Secretary General of the National Assembly Party. Thank you for joining us, Abdullah.
[00:00:40] Speaker B: Thank you so much, Robert. And I'm really excited about this and about the project and talking to your audience.
[00:00:48] Speaker A: Thank you. Yes, we're very glad to have you here. We're going to address a little bit more later, but you've recently just come out with a new edited volume titled the Quest for Democracy in Saudi Arabia, which is very exciting.
[00:01:00] Speaker B: Yes, I'm really happy about that. I think.
So the volume is basically bringing experts, some policy experts and academics, in addition to those who come from the Saudi society and studied it from the inside and then write about it.
Write about it like abroad, because we never had the chance to really freely basically talk about the Saudi society and what it is and what it looks like. I remember one expert once in a conference called the Saudi Society Black Hole.
I don't know if he meant like that sucks everything and then never tells you what it is and you can't tell what it is or just the fact that it's basically like a.
A vague but also very influential part of our orbit.
So that that's why we studied. So Saudi Arabia, we write about it from different aspects, one foreign policy, another one from the theoretical political, you know, aspirations toward democracy and approaching democracy and approaching, you know, the, what's called the Islamic politics or siyass.
And then third aspect is basically the human rights and the economic aspect of things, you know, inside Saudi Arabia. And what's exciting, I think, about the book and why I'm really proud of it is that I think it's the first of its kind to bring as many Saudis talking about Saudi bi because let's face it, like we Arabs, generally Muslims, are basically the lab in which others, you know, make so many trials on and in.
And we're never given the appropriate chance to talk about ourselves the way that we see it.
And you know, the thing also about the Saudi politics specifically is that it has been mobilized for so many decades by the most powerful folks from both sides from the east and from the West. And those powerful sides tend to portray the Saudi society as backward, as very extremist, very violent.
And why the Saudi rulers have such an interest in portraying that is to say to the west that the only way to guard such, you know, zealot, you know, foes is to have this dictatorship that controls them and imposes restrictions on them to try to forcefully also, quote, unquote, liberalize them and make them palatable basically to the West. So we poke a huge hole into that narrative. The book is basically shattering that, you know, monopoly over the narrative of what the Saudi society look like, of what, how Islam played a role into the Saudi society and how Islam is interpreted or can be interpreted. And that's why I presented, and I know it's a long, it's a long answer to a question, but just to, it's like I presented the works of one of the people I really, really admire and I have his complete works right behind me here. Like a nine volume work.
All of his works. His name is Abdullah Hamid. And what he did is basically presented democracy from within, from within the theory of Islamic politics, Islamic culture, Islamic jurisprudence.
So that's why I think it is important.
[00:05:35] Speaker A: Absolutely. And I want to take up that point. You just brought up the late Abdullah Hamid.
In the work, you dedicate a chapter to his work. Your chapter, where you speak about what you describe is his concept of constitutional resumption.
And you, you write in the work that his ideas are not necessarily just confined to Saudi Arabia, that they can go beyond it. But speaking to the project itself, you really bring out his work. And I just wonder if you'd take a second to talk a little bit more about who abdullahamid was and the significance of his work and specifically this question of constitutional resumption as it relates to the case of Saudi Arabia and to the Muslim world.
[00:06:28] Speaker B: Absolutely. Great question.
Well, Abdullah Hamid was imprisoned about seven, eight years, eight times. And every time he's imprisoned for a few years.
There was one time when the Saudi government try to, you know, make amends with him and his group at that time they were called the Constitutionalists.
It's like they were supposed to be the founder and fathers if we were, if we were to have ones, you know, in Saudi Arabia for our democracy that we aspired to and never had, you know, so what? So he was released and then he was imprisoned and released and banned from trouble and then released and then tortured and then imprisoned. And he's like, so all of his life is basically kind of portray of what, you know, the civil society, you know, struggle in our country, Saudi Arabia, and why it is a constitutional resumption for two Basic but really important reasons. One theory and one practice. So the theory is basically. And that's. And that. And this is the part where it goes really way beyond Saudi Arabia to all the Muslim and Islamic and even in the world generally. It's like why it is a constitutional resumption. Because what Abdullah Hamid did in theory is basically he said the things that I'm going to present to you, the Muslims around the world, it's not something that I invented. It's something that I resume from our Islamic civilization during the peak of all of our, you know, things is to bring back the elements that can make us basically really a great contribution to the world by being, just by being, you know, by having what's called the separation of realms instead of separation of powers, you know, between, you know, one realm and another where the ruler may still rule on things, but the general public have a, like a more say on so many things that are more like educational, health care, economy and everything.
Like whenever, like we, we once had during, you know, the classical period and, and after that until like what's.
What. What has become the, the very, you know, kind of dark ages of ours, right During, I would say, I would say the 17th and 18th century. So what Abdul Hamid said in theory is that, well, there are concepts like the. I'll give you just quick, quick examples of. For the concepts that I presented the concept, the concepts of deputies, he said, presented in Islamic politics, deputies is basically what we know today as like representatives. They were like the idea of like. So he's. He theorized about the idea of elections and he brought stories from our history, from the jurisprudence and how this is not just possible, but has been, had been practiced, but maybe not in the same exact way that we see it today. But he said the rules and the ideas were there. We just abandoned them during the stagnation of our civilization and our history.
So this was so the idea of debutization.
And the second idea is what he called the diversity or the diversification of the rulers.
Meaning it's like he's saying like, you never find. One of the things that he like, amazed me about Abdullah is he made a challenge to so many scholars. He said, bring me a phrase or a word or a quotation where the ruler is singular. It's always plurals, like Quran.
And he said, that's why he said they are always plural. It's never one guy, one person who has the ultimate authority and the ultimate arbiter for everything about politics in Islam.
So this is what he theorized about this is a quick example.
I can't fully present them in such a quick manner, but I'm just giving you glimpses of some of the theories he gave in theory. And then that's why it is the constitutional resumption, because he's resuming these constitutional elements from our history in order to present them today to bring about democracy that we want. So that's in theory, in practice, and quickly. Also, he presented a constitutional resumption in which he said that, well, even in Saudi Arabia, and that's where the local element comes in play. He said in Saudi Arabia, when King Abdelaziz unified all these regions, south Arabia, it was on the promise that all of these regions will be part of how they govern themselves.
And so he's saying that I'm only going back to the promise where we started. I'm going back to these elements that we started, for example, in 1929, when King Abdelazi started this semi parliament that had elections in Jeddah in 1929. Just imagine, like almost 100 years ago and today we are still debating in Saudi Arabia whether democracy is, like, compatible and, you know, potentially available to us or even theoretically possible.
You know what I mean? So that's why the idea of constitutional resumption is to say that it's constitutionally what this project constitutionally resumes, what had been started or what had been once been practiced or theorized.
[00:13:22] Speaker A: So in your work, you've addressed this point before, but I want to bring it out here as well, because what we're talking about, about this idea of constitutional resumption is this idea that there was kind of maybe a promise, a vision at the beginning of the Saudi state that the argument isn't, okay, we're throwing that away. We're returning, which is a very challenging argument to those who would say, oh, well, no, you're just trying to throw everything out. But then the other part of this is the Saudi state itself has used religion, has used Islamic theology, has used claims of sharia, of Islamic law to justify its power and to justify this centrality.
And so I guess the question to flip, that is, and you addressed it in the point regarding the vision of King Abdulaziz, but what role do Islamic theology and law play in challenging authoritarianism and despotism in Saudi Arabia and then also in the broader Muslim world.
[00:14:29] Speaker B: Absolutely.
A really interesting question. So look what Abdel al Hamid and others did, and also my father in his book Questions on Revolutions, on revolutions during the Arab Spring, they basically went to the very foundation of what Saudi Arabia claims to be.
And then they flipped it on them and then they say, well, if you want to follow Islam and apply Sharia, well, Sharia is about respecting the people first and allowing the choice to be made by the public, by the people first.
And so this is the Sharia coming from the very experts of Sharia, an unsharya from someone like my father who basically spent all his life, he's 70 year old now, who spent all his life theorizing, writing, reading, lecturing, preaching about what Islam and concepts of Islam and change.
And that's what he concluded. What Abdullah Hamid and others also said in all their books is exactly what you mentioned, which is to say, take the example of the concept that has been really used and abused by all authoritarian regimes, including the Saudi government. The the concept of bayah, which is basically allegiance.
So what Abdel Alhamid did, and I mentioned that in so many places, but it's worth mentioning here, he went to this concept of baya and he flipped it and he said, let's go back to what baya according to, yes, experts and jurists of Islam and classical jurists. So he said baya is from the word baya, which is basically sale or contract. And he said for the contract and sale, like in English, like in the common law system or the American law system, right? For the contract to be valid, it has to be between two parties. And for these parties to accept they have to have the consent. They have to have the equal footing in order for these two parties to basically perform that and to make it functional. You can't impose upon someone a contract and consider it valid. This is just basically coercion. This is duress.
You can't do something under duress. And that's what all these alleged contracts with the ruled in the authoritarian regimes, when they say bay', ah, it's like you can't have bay' ah on people who have no choice whether to give bay' ah or not, whether to choose or not, whether to want the system or not, whether to want you as a person or a ruler or not. So he said for this to happen, we have to have the consent.
We have to have this, you know, vehicle of allowing people to choose. And this is where he comes to fill this gap with this idea of like, well, democracy gives a great vehicle to present and to have elections, to have representatives, to have consent that is required for any bay' ah for any allegiance to be given to any ruler. So when he gave that, I think that was like basically shaking the ground of how Saudi Arabia presented Sharia and that's why I think they really targeted him and attacked him. Because basically this is saying, well, this is nothing about Islam, what you have been practicing for the last few decades. And we only going back to real Islamic application of what Islamic politics is when we only when we, you know, have consent, when we have equal footing, when we have the option and choice of choosing the ruler who represent us.
[00:18:51] Speaker A: Thank you for that. Very well presented answer.
The other piece of the law, right, is okay, who has legitimacy.
And then something that's often weaponized is this question of rebellion resistance which you touched on.
You know, the Saudi state and a lot of you have clerics who say things like, not only do you have the right, you can't protest, you can't even sign petitions, you can't even, you have to love the ruler, you have to love them. Right? And so you have this sort of on the one hand, but this kind of question of rebellion, of being in this rebellious state is often kind of brought out to say, oh well, it's justified for us to imprison or kill these people because they fit into this category of Sharia. So could you just elucidate for us what are the laws of rebellion in Islamic law classically and how is that maybe not remembered purposely or not today in the Islamic world?
[00:19:56] Speaker B: Absolutely. So let's start with how it's presented or actually mispresented right now in our country and how it's being practiced.
And it has been abused not just by the current authoritarian governments, but, but by some, even one man rule in our history, you know, more or less the ideas that they presented or how they presented the idea of rebellion is to say, well, whoever is in force.
Rule in a state or a polity or a country, they have the right basically to fight or even kill anybody who challenges them.
And you know, within that opinion, they also justified, and this has been developed even by some Saudi state unsponsored clerics saying that even the chat, if the challenge is not even physical, meaning like not actual fighting, but rather intellectual fighting.
So they basically broaden the idea of when to fight or execute even individuals to include those who, let's face it, disagree with the government on this idea and concept. And, and this has been abused and used big time by all authoritarian regimes. But the example of Saudi Arabia is just one of the peak demonstration of this abuse of concept of rebellion. And the idea, if you go back to the idea of what rebellion is, rebellion is, it's not like when you disagree with the man or the one person who came in force, but with the legitimate diverse group of society that brings tranquility to the public and agreed again on the concept that they have been consensual. There has been consensual agreement to rule according to these rules, and those who violate these rules are their rebellion.
It's kind of comparable to the idea of law and order in modern states.
I don't want to go back to this differentiation between what modern state is and pre modern and postmodern theories and all that. But the thing here is to say the concept is comparable to rule of law and those who violate the rule of law got punished according to how egregious the violation is. So if the violation is to physically take, arm and fight the state, then the answer is basically to fight back, to bring them to justice in order to bring tranquility. So there is a, you see here there is a huge difference between one, the premise of legitimizing a one man rule who takes force to oppress people, to kill them and execute them, and on the other hand, the larger group of folks who represent society in a consensual manner with agreements and rules agreed upon by all society and different factors, factions of society, in order to bring tranquility. So you see, I would say the main difference between the two scenarios here is that the first basically terrorizes people in order to protect the throne of one man or one person, while the other try to tranquilize, if I use this word correctly, society in order to apply rule of law and basically the law and order.
[00:24:41] Speaker A: Thank you.
So for our listeners, you hold degrees in both Islamic law and in international law. And so you've written about this sort of interplay, which you just did a very good job of, kind of showing how they relate to one another and how they're often misunderstood, misrepresented. So in your dissertation you spoke about this kind of question of race realms a little bit. So you talk about, you propose a two pronged method, as you put it, to address the crisis of authority that is pervading many Muslim majority countries. Obviously the case of Saudi Arabia is particularly egregious. Can you talk about the distinction you make between the constitutional and then the meta constitutional spheres?
[00:25:27] Speaker B: Absolutely.
Okay, so this is going to be a bit the academic, but I'm trying to break it down to the folks listening here.
So a lot of people, when they hear the constitutional order, they assume it's all about this written constitutions.
So academics and experts now tend to say this is largely reductive meaning the idea of a constitutional order is not just to have a written constitution. You get sometimes a constitutional orders where there is even, not, there is not even written constitution, but rather constitutional ideas and various constitutional amendments or various constitutional documents that make up this idea of constitution or make up this idea of how the constitutional order should operate.
So this is number one, and to begin with, this idea of the constitution, it's not just about this written constitution, so it's the constitutional order rather that basically brings about the ideas of either separation of powers or checks and balances, where a system is designed to be stable through not allowing one branch of government or one group or one party or one institution to basically have the ultimate power or to have limitless powers. So that's why they created a system with a designer system where it's not just about the written constitution because, and I say that because there is this, this thing in the, in the literature that they call the Whitemer syndrome.
It's, it's basically this perfectly designed and written constitution in the pre Nazi Germany where it allowed Hitler and the Nazi to take over and therefore abuse this idea of elections and democracy. So they said, well, what went wrong with all of that? The constitution? And then like every expert went back to that constitution. It was written perfectly. So it's not about the constitution, it's about allowing the struggle of the public. It's allowing this counterbalancing of the civil society to exist. It's allowing the free press, even if it's written there, but to push back, to always have this idea of pushing back and to allow the public and the people to have the power to say no.
So when I studied that, it was like, well, yeah, it's not just about the constitution. It's not about the constitutional even order. Sometimes you're gonna have some folks, well, who have a great powerless power, if I may say, a great say in trying to counterbalance the system without being part of it. And who can play that role better than who played it for many, many centuries in Islamic history. And created, I would say, while halal called the paradigm, I may disagree with some of his concepts, but I think this idea of creating this, I would say matrix or metric where the jurists play the role of protecting the domain of the legislation, protecting the domain of education by having these endowed schools and endowed, you know, like hostels and all that.
And you have this, the separate and independent economy where the merchants, the traders have their own basically rules and realm and you get all these basic, I would say, institutions in life without any of these institutions being part of the state. And at the same time you get the state that also in its own, has its own, or should it have its own checks and balances. So the meta constitutional sphere or made a constitutional idea is to say, is to place the question, the very controversial and the debate that occupies the minds of many people of what the scholars role, for example, in these revolutions in the Arab world and how they become part of the democratic transition or hinder it and what are the role that they supposed to have.
So the role that I create, not created, but I supported and I thought it actually speaks again to a historical role and also a very theoretically not just acceptable, but recommendable in their own theories and the classical work. And is this role where they have two prongs, where the first prong is the state level prong, where there is a legislature that is basically elected.
And the role of what Islam is and the interpretation of Islam is to the legislature on the state level and on the society level.
It is a free floating sphere for these scholars to debate like we, like parliamentarians have the freedom, so we give them the freedom that the parliamentarians have to debate, to discuss, to freely be part of this society without having a formal or efficient official power. So I don't know if I present that in a understandable manner, but I'm trying to break down, you know,
[00:32:20] Speaker A: absolutely.
[00:32:21] Speaker B: This complex and, you know, complicated idea of the role in both state level and society level.
[00:32:31] Speaker A: Absolutely. And something that the Saudi state, which this book goes into in, in a quite detailed way, is this attempt to kind of subsume all of these responsibilities, all of these different spheres into one state, into often one person who is kind of the arbiter. And so then that also leads to, well, who's in the in group and who's in the out group. Who is, you know, committing rebellion, who is, who's considered Muslim. Right. Who is considered a citizen. Right. So on that one point there, I was wondering if you could speak to the role of sectarianism as a tool of the Saudi state for maintaining its hold in power.
[00:33:19] Speaker B: Absolutely. So let's remember when King Abdelaziz.
So this is just a historical narrative. When King Abdulaziz tried to bring back again the, you know, the throne of his great grandfathers, the first and second Saudi state. Because the current King Abdulaziz is basically the founder of modern Saudi Arabia that we know today, which is the third Saudi state, but it's the first modern, you know, state that we know as Saudi Arabia today.
So Abdulaziz was Basically descendant of the great grandfather of Muhammad bin Saud. Muhammad Bin Saud, who first began the first Saudi state, started this alliance between him and Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab. Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab is the basically founder of what we know today as Wahhabism is a doctrine that actually says in its own presentation, the idea is to unify God. But in the process, they judge so many Muslims around the world to be failing on their own threshold of what unification is, because they have a very narrow definition of how unification of God in Islam is. And therefore basically in one way or another denounced the vast majority of Muslims around the world to be, one way or another, polytheists.
And therefore.
So the tricky part is not just about Islamically judging the vast majority of people around the world, but also the political amplification and the consequence. The political consequence of this is to be Islamically not just allowed, but encouraged to wage wars in order to bring people to Islam.
So that's where it's basically the ISIS that succeeded to be a state.
Let's face it. I mean, I'm not even joking here. It's a state. I mean, if Al Baghdadi succeeded the way that Saudi Arabia succeeded, it will be.
The people of Iraq and city will be called Baghdadis, you know, you know, attributed to him and his last name. So that's what Saudi is. Saudis are like attributed to the House of Saudi.
That's how they called it. It's basically this venture that one, Islamically denounced people and called them and exclude them from being Muslims and the vast majority of Muslims around the world.
And two, as a consequence of that, they allowed themselves. And that's how the first and second Saudi state expanded, you know, largely from just one town to whole region to the whole like majority of the Arab minus Saudi even reached Iraq and Yemen and part of Oman and then now became just the Saudi Arabia that we know today. So within all of that, the, the very core of idea is basically a sectarian project, is to say that we are the sect that actually has a monopoly over the truth of an interpretation of Islam.
And therefore all other sects, including the Shias, are either in a, in a.
It just, they are classified in this scale of infidels, maybe like just not, not sometimes, not some, some, some of them are like really mushrik according to them or like semi mushrik or just mobted or, you know, and then you get all the.
That's why they call it a puritarian, I think, you know, school of thought. I don't know if puritan is also the right, you know, word here. But you got the idea.
[00:37:56] Speaker A: Yeah. And you brought up this point about waging war to.
And, and I, I wanted to mention that because obviously for the, for those who maybe don't know, but it's very much been going on for years now, the Saudi war on Yemen. And how does this relate to the ideology of authoritarianism? Because I think for a lot of people looking at the outside, don't know a lot about it, they look and they say, I don't understand. You know, they say this is the Yemeni government, but it's in Riyadh. So then where's the Yemeni government?
So could you just talk a little bit about the Yemen, the war on Yemen and what it represents, the Saudi state.
[00:38:37] Speaker B: So, yeah, just quickly to continue the thought and apply it to the, to the situation of Yemen.
When the Yemen war started in 2015, they used all Islamic concepts to apply to this, including calling the Yemenis the Majus or calling Zaydis as a Shia infidels, and then also considering the fighting against these guys as a jihad.
So they use all available concepts that, you know, that are available and they have been used by the Saudi government, but it has been overlooked by the west because it serves some kind of interests at that time. And also they buy so many, so many, you know, arms sales from the west. So they look the other way.
And, you know, so you see the sectarian like element to this is saying, well, look, the Shia in Sana' a and these Zaydis in Sana', an, these Mejus in Sana' A are going to take over like town after town. And therefore, their, you know, expansive project is basically to reach Mecca, is to reach Medina and control you and control the Arabian Peninsula. The only way to fight back is to take on the offensive. And by the way, let's be clear on this.
It was never like a defensive in the way that Saudi Arabia was trying to defend its borders. It was Saudi Arabia who started the war 2015. And even this time, like this current, even recent escalation since May and June and then July and then forward, it became even more violent.
Is.
So let's go back a little bit to 2015. So Saudi Arabia started this war in order to scale back the, the.
And push back against the, the Houthis. The idea is to scale back against the Houthis because they did not want the Houthis to control Sana' A or control the north of Yemen, specifically the north of Yemen, which for the Saudi government Threatens them. It's. It's like the south in the southern border of Saudi Arabia, where they have control over all that and control over the border, and therefore, you know, threaten them. So they said, this is the idea. So the funny part is that when, when this war started in 2015, the assessment is that the Houthis fight Houthi fighters were actually 30,000 people. Right now it's 300,000 people. It's like 10 times more. So just like everything aside, like, strategically speaking, it's a huge failure from your side, even, like, let alone everything else, let alone this moral. And how, how many, like, you know, casualties you have killed and how many women just lost? Like, just last Wednesday, they killed 50 people, including 13 women and six or seven children. Like, what are the objectives of all this?
You know, attacks and strikes on Yemenis? And what is this, you know, what is the end game to all of this? It's basically, Saudi Arabia is pushing for more and more because Mohammed bin Salman wants the ultimate power, and he thinks that he can win the war militarily. And he thinks that the only way to unify people is to continue fight and fight and fight and quote, unquote, rally people, like, you know, behind the flag.
That's his way of trying to basically play into this ultra nationalist hype in the Saudi society because he lacks everything else. He's not elected, he's not legitimate, he's not popular, he's not loved.
And the economy is in its worst situation. Vision 2030 failed miserably in all fronts.
And, you know, the only way is to, you know, continue the war because it will just, you know, make people busy about fighting this external, you know, enemy instead of looking at their own.
[00:43:17] Speaker A: Absolutely. And so the book, which I encourage everybody to read, the Quest for Democracy in Saudi Arabia, but the first section is History and Politics. So we've spent some time talking about that. The second section is United States of America and impact on possible local democracy. And then the third section, as you mentioned, is social movements and human rights in Saudi Arabia. So just for that second section, just to speak to that for a second, you know, normally the question about Abraham Accords is always posed as, you know, what is it doing for Israel? Right. But I wanted to kind of flip that. So could you say, like, talk a little bit about what the role of the Abraham Accords is in actually supporting maybe the Saudi state? Like, what is the relationship between the US And Israel in sort of propping up the Saudi state?
[00:44:06] Speaker B: Yeah, you know, I want to bring a quote of My friend Amrab d' Alaziz who once said, yes, there may be not a formal normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel right now, but it's like the relationship of Ronaldo and Georgina. They have lived together for a long time, they have kids together, they have so many interests, they love each other, but they never formalized that relationship or officiated it.
So the, the, the, the basically the normalization is to diplomatically exchange ambassadors. So the idea is to say like I remember like in 2018 when they hacked cell phones of, of Saudi dissidents, they were using the Pegasus program, It's an Israeli developed program. And by the way, Mohammed bin Salman used that against his own cousins in order to spy on them. So just imagine Mohammed Salman is giving the Israelis the back door of every conversation that his own cousins in South Saudi Arabia talking about each other in the very, you know, core and important and sensitive institutions of Saudi Arabia. And not just voluntarily giving that to Israel, but giving them money and above that because he's buying all of these programs and these technology.
So it's from then it's been a long time discussion about this Abraham accord.
During the first year of the Biden administration, they also allowed the air space for Israel to be used. And they said at that time, oh, it's just a Chicago agreement, whatever. They found a, you know, legal loophole to tell the Saudi public. It's not, it's not like a huge development. It's, it's been there, we never used it. But right now we just, you know, command compliant by the legal element of all of that.
And then in 2023, Hamad bin Salman said it to many groups and then said it publicly on Fox News. He said we have never been closer to normalizing relations, relations with Israel than today.
The only thing that actually hindered all of that is actually no other than the October 7th attack.
And then, so that, and then made, I mean the developments were in two fronts. One, Israel in the first few months after the attack of the October 7, 2023, they were never even interested in, in normalizing with Arabia at that time because they had bigger fish to fry as they say, which is Gaza that they fried.
So, so they, they, they, they were interested in, in that and they had their own internal politics to deal with and to address before even talking about countries like Saudi Arabia. So the Saudi government was so pissed that it's like, well I'm interested but it's like a one one way love or one one sided love and it's not returned by Israel.
And then when Israel did all these atrocities across the borders and everywhere and in Gaza and they wiped out neighborhoods and killed so many children and women, that became really, really hard on every Muslim around the world and every human being, actually.
But also for the Saudis, who always care about the normal, the ordinary people within the Arabian Peninsula. And the Saudis, like, really sympathetic to this issue of Palestine. So they think, well, I mean, you know, normalizing a relationship is always bad, but it's in way, way worse now with Israel doing all of that. So Mohammed bin Salman, even during that time, he did not close the door. He just wanted the right price. So he was negotiating the right price for it. He said, well, right now it's very, very hard, but actually I want something in return. And all he said, and this is documented everywhere. He said, I'm not asking the Benjamin Netanyahu government, who used to be or the Israeli government to recognize Israel, to present Israel for me to sell this to the public, like I'm doing some progress thing on the ground, but just to say it.
So there is. There is an Arabic song that says, right? This is like. I mean, she's saying to the lover, say, even, like, even if you are lying, that you love me, you know.
So what Mohammed Salman is trying to say is like, yeah, just say it. Don't do it. Just give me things.
Say things. Because the requirement for Muhammad bin Salman to enter this project of normalization is for Israel to start the discussion about Palestinian statehood, Right?
It's not even like, start the process.
It's to start the discussion about it. It's like, just discuss it, you know,
[00:49:45] Speaker A: say something. Yeah,
[00:49:46] Speaker B: say something. Give me something. And even that Israelis were not even ready to give it.
[00:49:51] Speaker A: Yeah,
[00:49:51] Speaker B: just imagine. So they made it really difficult for Mohammed Ib Salman. So he was like, you know, I don't know if I can do it right now. It's really hard, but I can't do everything else. And there was even a discussion about the Israelis joining the efforts of the Saudis attacking Yemeni towns in order to quote, unquote, to push back against the Houthis.
But they were also reports about intelligence exchange and intelligence help and all that, but have never been, at least, at least from what we know, publicized that an actual help on the ground happened from the Israelis in the war of Yemen Yet.
[00:50:41] Speaker A: And, yeah, as the Atlantic reported last year, you know, MBS reportedly or two years ago, I guess, would have told Anthony Blinken, the then Secretary of State, that he didn't care about Palestine, he didn't care about the Palestinian issue, as he put it.
[00:50:56] Speaker B: Netanyahu said last week, like just two weeks ago, he said Mohamed Ben cares about the Palestinian issue as much as I do.
[00:51:05] Speaker A: Wow. In the midst of a genocide, you know, you know, and so, but what I think they reported is he said, oh, but my people care or something.
And so that kind of brings the interesting point. You know, you have this figure in Mohammed bin Salman who is exercising total authoritarian control over his people, whereas the people in Saudi Arabia are not, as he said, you know, they care about Palestine, they care about dignity for themselves, the ability, self autonomy, as you were saying. And so you have this sort of dichotomy where in the west you have figures openly embracing MBS in the us Whether it's a Democrat like Joe Biden or Trump or, you know, or you have like Macron, you have all of these figures kind of embracing him while speaking and paying lip service to human rights, you know, talking about, we care about human rights, we about care, care about this. But then giving weapons money and then public support, and then even in this war on Yemen, as you mentioned, arms transfers, intelligence.
How can we understand the relationship then between social movements in Saudi Arabia, which are addressed in this book, and the sort of lip service paid to human rights by Western political figures?
[00:52:26] Speaker B: Well, yeah, I mean, so that's the dilemma that is never resolved.
It's a dilemma from the civil society perspective. I mean, there is something that they love to call here in the city, in Washington D.C. and every, you know, decision making corner.
You come across the word that they call the real politique. And I hate it so much. I hate it not because the word itself, but what it implies, what it means.
It's creating a dichotomy between ethics, principles, morals, and how the world operate and how the world should rule.
And it also implies that how the world is run is basically the rules of how you should run.
It tells you that principles takes not just a backseat, it's outside the car when it comes to driving politics.
And I understand if we say that in order to understand the politics, you need to understand the real politic.
But to say, but it's another thing if you say in order to apply and yourself act in politics, you need to follow real politik. You know what I mean? It's a huge difference between understanding what's happening, because what's happening includes a lot of crimes, including war crimes, including immoral things, criminal characters in all across the spectrum, in all countries, and between, you know, saying, oh yeah, I need to understand that or saying that it's allowed to sit, to do that because it's already been done. You know what I mean?
I mean, the example that I can give is to say, well, if you are studying a Mafia, it's okay to understand it, to read about it, to watch movies or to watch Sopranos, for example, in order to understand the minds of the Mafia.
And it's even interesting sometimes to watch it and to read about it, to understand it.
But this is something that is hugely different than saying in order to operate in the neighborhood that the mafia exists in, you need to look like them and operate like them and to function like them and to think like them. I think this is the tricky part and the slippery slop and that's what the real politicians says, actually. It's like, oh, you need to do that. So that's what the, the, the, the, you know, basically subsequent, like, basically administrations here in the US and even elsewhere around the world basically did and, and have been doing, which is just to follow this real politic of saying, oh yeah, we know, we understand what Saudi does and is, and we just want to make deals with them. We want to get as much quote, unquote interest as we can with them.
And we're going to discuss sometimes from time to time, principles. But this is the principles, this is what you exactly call the lip surface.
It's like it's used in order to just basically save face, to make them look good, but not to change dramatically things on the ground or to move things around in order to reach the conclusions that we should reach or release the people that should be released or protect the people that we should protect. You know what I mean?
[00:56:42] Speaker A: Yes.
So on the kind of, the point about this sort of appeal, this appeal that MBS tries to create to the west, right. So, you know, trying to make things more palatable for Western investment.
Not, not because of any attempt to create better conditions for the people in Saudi Arabia, but to appeal.
There's this, he's brought up a few times now, MBS has this idea of recompiling the Ahadith, the narrations of the Prophet.
And I bring this up because the introduction, the book you have Dr. Khalid Abou Fadl writing, who has, and as many scholars talked about the need for rigorous interrogation of the Hadith traditions, which is its own intellectual project.
But I've seen even among critics or people who are somewhat critical of the human rights record of Saudi Arabia, normal people, they'll be like, oh, I don't like mbs, but hey, I mean, he's saying he's going to do that. Isn't that good? You know, he says. And so I just wanted to give you a chance to maybe address because I think that there's a little bit of a.
It does get some people, whether they're political figures or maybe just normal people, who to stop short of fully criticizing the despotism because they don't see it in that. So I was just wondering if you could bring that out.
[00:58:13] Speaker B: Absolutely. That's a great question. So let me tell you this.
Two years ago, Mohammed bin Salman was on an interview, and during the interview, he quoted a hadith. And he said, we want to apply this.
And the hadith is not just weak and by ahad, it's a hadith that even he butched and butchered, in which he said, if there's an extremist you need to kill, and I'm going to kill all extremists.
And then he basically is invoking a quote and trying to apply hadith. So this is the example I'm trying to give is to say he never cares about mutawatir.
He once said in interview, oh, yeah, only the mutawatir we need to. And he only says that because it gives him so much margin to do anything and call it Islam. That's all. It's not like he genuinely knows even what mutawatr is. I don't think he even knows. The example I gave here is this.
And in another interview, he actually said to the Atlantic guy, you know, he once did an interview with the Atlantic and it was published extensively.
And a good portion of that was about Islam and how you should interpret Islam. And an interesting part of that is, is he actually exactly saying that the only genuine mujtahid in Saudi Arabia is a ruler? It's like me, it's like, you know, I'm the only guy who legitimately can interpret Islam.
You know, it's like not even like, I mean, the funny thing is like, he calling out like, wullahatul faqi. And this is not even wullayatul faqeeh. This is like wullayat the guy. You know, it's like, you know what I mean? It's like, it's not like just the general audience is the guardianship of the jurist. It's a concept within. It's like being developed in the modern Iran of like the mujtahid and how they rule. And they interpreted the. Like they allow during the ghayba or the disappearance of the Imam, 12th Imam, to still be in politics and interpret Islam. But Muhammad bin Salman is not even like. And the funny thing is, like, they always calling out this concept in Iran, but at the same time, they're not even applying that level of, like, you know, theory. It's like, oh, the guardianship of the guy, of this person in power, whoever is.
And he's not even equipped in any way possible to interpret anything, let alone Islam, like he's incompetent.
But nevertheless, he said he's the only person in Saudi Arabia that is legitimately allowed to interpret what Islam is. And this is only, again, only to give him so much power to do anything you can think of and call it Islam. And I think this is not just, my friend, this is not just authoritarian, by the way. This is very, very tricky.
This is trying to portray Islam to the public in a way that you basically provoke the very core of every Muslim in Saudi Arabia and basically allow for, God forbid, an explosion of things and society in Saudi Arabia. And that's what we warn against.
[01:02:30] Speaker A: And going from somebody, as we were talking about MBS who has no training and no understanding perhaps of Sharia or Islamic law, I want to end the conversation by pivoting to the opposite of that. Your father, Salman, who continues to face imprisonment by the Saudi state, and you've talked about, but his decades of expertise and study of Islamic law and legal theory, ethics.
Just wanted to give you a chance to say what your father's case represents for the Islamic world. And then the two side questions to that, if you want to take either are, are there lessons or principles that you take from your father that your father's teaching to you, that really influence your own work?
And what actions can people take, especially here in the US to support your father's case and people like him and the people of Saudi Arabia. So out there, but just want to.
[01:03:28] Speaker B: Yes, yeah, absolutely.
So, yeah. So my father, next September is going to mark the 10th year, decade, basically, in solitary confinement. Solitary confinement in the international standard standards is basically a form of torture. Is one of the ugliest forms of torture because you basically drive people insane when you put them alone for not just weeks and weeks and months and months, but years and years.
And it's only God's mercy that he did not lose his mind.
And people do not lose their mind in Saudi prisons.
He faced torture. He lost half of his vision and half of his hearing.
He was mistreated. He was put in chair during interrogations for many days without even allowed to eat or drink.
And 19 members of my family were also punished and banned from shovel. And my uncle was detained for eight years.
My cousin was detained for six years.
They went after me, my family and everybody around me just to punish us for expressing our free opinion. And I think all of that is not just because, you know, a tweet, although the tweet was basically, I would say, well, broke the camel's back and the camel here is in BS or the Saudi state.
The tweet that he called for reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and rulers in the Gulf and in the Arab world and to use diplomacy instead of war and violence.
That's what he was arrested for.
But I think the. The deeper understanding of this relationship and why the basically the fear is, was what Mullah Rashid and Dr. Khalil B. Fadl and others talked about is to say that he represented, and we talked about here in this episode is he represents the.
The basically shaken of the foundation of this authoritarian regime in Saudi Arabia by somebody who is way more authoritative, way more popular, and way more versed either in social or political or religious, you know, terms in Saudi Arabia.
In 2011, my father spearheaded a petition that was called towards a state of rights and institutions, basically corinth for a democracy.
Within few days, 18,000 people signed. It shook the kingdom. Like 18,000 was like a huge number to mobilize the public in a few days.
It was unprecedented. I never heard of in the history of Saudi Arabia to the degree that at that time, King Abdullah's throne was shaken and he was calling my father, it's like, oh, calm down, let's do this, let's talk about it. And King Abdullah created a committee to discuss the matter of, like, how to deal with this situation.
And then the committee's believe it or not recommendation has to be unanimous.
So all of the princes who gathered and all the elites and all the decision makers in Saudi Arabia at the time agreed to transform into a sort of constitutional monarchy. Except for two people, including Salman, who was looking, you know, for his own throne at that time. He was almost going to be a deputy. He was almost a crown prince.
And he was like, Salman, the king right now.
[01:07:56] Speaker A: Yeah.
[01:07:57] Speaker B: And so they never, never, you know, forget this, you know, about my father.
And then there was also one time when my father called corruption on national TV and all that.
So basically they hated this class of theorists, of public sphere activists, of jurists, of scholars, of, you know, public figures who basically represent the potential for, you know, a just state and a just government and democratic system in the country that actually those who calls out dictatorship. Because believe it or not, Saudi Arabia right now says that democracy is basically a kuffer. It's like leaving Islam. And that's why they're trying to so to have some such a theory with folks who, not just saying the opposite, but actually acting for it and pushing for it and have the mobilization techniques and really popular threatens the existence of this very fragile ground of the state.
Like when my father was detained, just to show you, like, it's symbolic, but it shows you something, at least on X or Twitter it was called at that time.
He has like 14 million followers and the king himself has like 7 million followers. So my father had double what the King has. So whenever he writes a tweet, I swear to God, even King Salman would pick up the phone and call my father and it's like, urge him to like delete a tweet or change it or change the language or change the tone. This is how popular my father is.
So, so. So my father represents. And others and Abdullah Hamed and all like represent this potential.
[01:10:15] Speaker A: Yeah.
[01:10:17] Speaker B: And they. And they represent the counter revolution or the counter potential of killing this project, killing this venture of allowing the people to breathe.
So that's why when Khashoggi left, he said, I left because I was suffocated.
I wanted to go somewhere where I can breathe and say and express myself. And that's what I did too.
Unfortunately, my father never had the chance that I have. But I'm calling for those who listen to this or care about it to join me in advocating for this and reminding the public about it.
[01:11:03] Speaker A: Thank you so much, Abdullah.
The new book the Quest for Democracy in Saudi Arabia, published by Palgrave macmillian, has just been released in the last few weeks and I really encourage all of our listeners to go and check it out. Support your work and thank you so much for being here as a guest on the Maidan podcast. We hope to see more of you and hear more of your incredibly impactful work. Thank you so much for being with us.
[01:11:32] Speaker B: Inshaallah. Thank you so much, Robert.